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EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT OF OIL AND GAS
ROYALTIES
"It is generally more important that the rule of law should
be settled than that it should be theoretically correct."' As legal
theory gradually crystallizes, reason comes to play less significant
a part in the judicial process than strict adherence to established
precedents.2  The supreme court of appeals has had ample oppor-
tunity recently to demonstrate the essential truth of these observa-
tions, even when aware of weighty arguments favoring an opposite
result.3 Disposing finally of a vexing issue that yielded sharp con-
1 'er Lord Cottenham, L. C., in Lozon v. Pryse, 4 My]. & C. 600, 617, 41
Eng. Rep. R. 231 (1840). Cf. Bailhache, J., in Belfast Ropewalk Co. v.
Bushell, [1918] 1 K. B. 210, 213: "Unfortunately or fortunately, I am not
sure which, our law is not a science."
2 See Note (1908) 24 L. Q. REv. 116, 117: " But we in England have long ago
committed ourselves to the principle that, within limits to be settled by the
House of Lords and the Court of Appeal, uncertainty in the law is a worse
evil than unreasonableness, and judges of first instance must continue 'falsely
true' to the errors - if they are such - of their predecessors."
3 Walker v. W. Va. Gas Corp., 3 S. E: (2d) 55 (W. Va. 1939).
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fliet in the past,4 the president of the court set forth its policy in
clear language :5
"We are not persuaded that the controversy is one that
should be reopened and thus bring about a feeling of uncer-
tainty on this very important feature of the law relating to
oil and gas. The question involved is one that many years
ago engaged the talents of able lawyers and judges .... ;
their views were widely divergent, as ours might be did we
feel at liberty to reopen the question."
The ratio decidendi of the West Virginia court simply reflects
another aspect of the same fundamental policy, - judicial prefer-
ence for settled doctrine during the period of "the maturity of
law. "I The prior cases, so it is said, had created "a rule of prop-
erty, with reference to which contracts had been made, and rights
had accrued and become vested."'7  Bearing in mind hardship in-
volved through "the retrospective effect of judge-made law"," the
court wisely refused to jeopardize legal incidents annexed to count-
less oil and gas leases now in effect.9 In other words, once a phase
of mineral ownership has become firmly entrenched in general com-
mercial practice,10 the elaborate framework of legal theory~will not
4 Within a period of four years, there were four three-to-two decisions,
the last three of which were contradictory in principle to the first and yet
failed to overrule it. Lengthy dissents occurred in three of the four cases.
Discussion appeared in Notes (1918) 25 W. VA. L. Q. 79; id. at 231; id. at 337;
(1919) 26 id. at 63.
rWalker v. W. Va. Gas Corp., 3 S. E. (2d) 55, 57 (W. Va. 1939). Cf. Rock
Spring Distilling Co. v. Gaines & Co., 246 U. S. 312, 320, 38 S. Ct. 327, 62 L.
Ed. 738 (1918), where McKenna, J., quotes the dictum of Circuit Judge San-
born, in Layton Pure Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co., 182 Fed. 35, 39 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1910): "Uniformity and certainty in rules of property are often more
important and desirable than technical correctness."
0 See POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON .JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1928) 24.
7 Walker v. W. Va. Gas Corp., 3 S. E. (2d) 55, 57 (W. Va. 1939). So, too,
Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Beloit, 215 Wis. 439, 444-445, 254 N. W. 119
(1934), per Fowler, J.: "The decision of the case lays down a rule of prop-
orty that has stood as the law of this state for over twenty years. In 3'eliance
upon the law as there declared, vast investments have doubtless been made
throughout the state in street-lighting equipment. Under the principle of
stare decisis, a rule of law in the nature of a rule of property once established
and acquiesced in without change by the legislature should be adhered to."
S CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1922) 146.
o Cf. the language of Hatcher, J., in Simmers v. Star Coal & Coke Co., 113
W. Va. 309, 313, 167 S. E. 737 (1933): "Therefore, we must follow the Griffin
decision not only because it is logical, but also because it has become a rule
of property in this state.... The fact that there was a dissent does not affect
it as such a rule."
10 Per Lord Westbury, L. C., in Ralston v. Hamilton, 4 Macq. 397, 405 (1862):
"It must be remembered that the rules which govern the transmission of prop-
erty are the creatures of positive law, and that when once established and
recognized, their justice or injustice in the abstract is of less importance t9
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be disturbed by later common law decision.11 Thus, equitable
apportionment of oil and gas royalties, where leased land is after-
wards subdivided and then developed, has been banished explicitly
from West Virginia jurisprudence. 12
In order to appreciate fully the importance of the present
holding, it would be well to explain not only the narrow problem
before the court but, indeed, the whole issue of equitable appor-
tionment. The ordinary case grows out of the execution of an oil
and gas lease, in the usual form, by the owner of a fairly extensive
tract. For some time, delay rentals are regularly paid by the
operator and development postponed, awaiting favorable condi-
tions. Meantime, through death or sale, the lessor's property passes
tc others and is subdivided, subject of course to the outstanding
lease. Each new subdivision owner then receives his proportionate
share of the accruing delay rentals, since the lease binds every part
of the original tract. Eventually, a successful well is drilled and
production begun; since the development is usually located wholly
within one of the subdivisions, its owner naturally claims the en-
tire amount of the oil or gas royalties, or gas well rentals. On the
other hand, the remaining subdivision owners assert there should
be fair division of these revenues, by reason of the fact that the
producer will probably drain all the land leased. Moreover, these
latter are precluded from prospecting on their own initiative, for
the lease constitutes a burden upon the whole acreage. The diffi-
culty is that the conveyance by which the lessor's tract was divided
has omitted any reference to the minerals. With such a seeming
deadlock between the respective contentions of the parties, solution
of the legal puzzle has to be based perforce on considerations of
policy that outweigh arguments of logic.
That is not to say that occasionally the equities will not clearly
favor one position or the other. For example, in an Odahoma
the community than that the rules themselves shall be constant and In-
variable. I I
11 "Such interpretation, even though originally erroneous, should not be
disturbed for the very cogent reason that in such situations the social interest
in the security of transactions outweighs the conflicting individual and social
interest in the just decision of particular cases." Hardman, A Problem in
Interpretation (1936) 42 W. VA. L. Q. 110, 129-130. Dean Hardman's observa-
tion was prompted by the quotation from Judge Hatcher's opinion, cited
.upra n. 9.
12 Until now, Campbell v. Lynch, 81 W. Va. 374, 94 S. E. 739 (1917),
favoring equitable apportionment, - bad never been definitely rejected in
specific language. There was always a chance, albeit a slim one, that Campbell
v. Lynch might someday be followed, at least on its precise facts.
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case, 3 the lessee apparently decided to avert controversy as regards
two later subdivision owners. Accordingly, this operator under-
took to drill a well exactly on the line separating the two lots, so
that equitable apportionment would necessarily be inevitabl6;
owing to a survey error, the producing well proved to be located
four feet over on the north side of the true boundary. Granted the
lessee was under no duty to drill an offset well, it is obvious that
the mistake in following the survey created no liability: the well
can be located wherever development policy determines its desir-
ability. Without apportionment, the owner of the south lot would
be remediless, despite almost certain drainage of his land. The
other side of the picture was described in a Texas dictum :14
"It was stated that the . . . . Company has one lease
covering 1,000,000 acres of land from the same owner ...
Suppose the owner should sell 75 acres in one corner to a party
. . . .who counts confidently on the one-eighth royalty at-
taching to that 75-acre tract. He induces the lessee to develop
his land, and a gusher is forthcoming. Under the rule [of
equitable apportionment], the man .... would be entitled to
only seventy-five one millionths of the one-eighth royalty....
A party owning another 75 acres 75 miles distant would get as
much from the oil.... And yet this man without the gusher
might not have a single drop of oil under his land, which is 75
miles distant from the gusher."15
Any hard and fast rule, granting absolutely or withholding com-
pletely equitable apportionment in each and every instance, will
no doubt prove to be abounding in incongruities of the types
illustrated.
Before attempting an analysis of the sharp divergence in the
authorities, it is necessary to exclude extraneous matters that might
serve here to confuse or becloud the issue. Certainly, partnership
or joint ventures in oil and gas leasing,"8 where several owners
13 Gat v. Metscher, 103 Okla. 271, 229 Pac. 522 (1924).
14 Japhet v. MeRae, 276 S. W. 669, 671 (Tex. Com. App. 1925).
15 Cf. Ritz, J., in Pittsburgh & W. Va. Gas Co. v. Ankrom, 83 W. Va. 81, 85,
97 S. E. 593 (1918): "It would, no doubt, result in some of the defendants
receiving part of the royalties for oil which was extracted from lands at a
distance of more than a mile from the lands owned by them, and which could
by no stretch of the imagination be taken to have been produced from theirlands."I
lo As in Lynch v. Davis, 79 W. Va. 437, 92 S. E. 427 (1917). Cf. Rymer v.
South Penn Oil Co., 54 W. Va. 530, 46 S. E. 559 (1904). Among the outside
authorities are Higgins v. California Petroleum & Asphalt Co., 109 Cal. 304,
41 Pac. 1087 (1895); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Est. & Oil Co.,
185 La. 751, 170 So. 785 (1936); and Lusk v. Green, 114 Okla. 113, 245 Pac.
636 (1926).
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voluntarily unite in one lease, - the implication being that profits
are to be fairly divided, - can scarcely assist in the solution: their
sharing has to do with the law of contracts, and only secondarily
with oil and gas leases.' 7 Similarly, no analogy can be drawn from
equitable apportionment of delay rentals, - in point of fact, no
other result is possible prior to actual development. By and large,
the precise nature of the oil and gas lease' taken by the operator
should make not the slightest difference, assuming it is understood
the lessee really receives some sort of profit a prendre.10 A more
involved consideration is the character of oil and gas title sanc-
tioned in the particular jurisdiction, (be it absolute ownership, "°
qualified ownership 2 ' or the no-ownership theory22). One needs
merely to keep in mind the factual possibility of drainage from
additional subdivision lots, along with the legal doctrine that the
lease binds not only the producing lot but every other subdivision
of the original tract. There is no essential injustice in omitting
all such prolonged discussion as to whether fugacious minerals are
even susceptible of ownership.
One might seek in lawyer-like fashion to distinguish the cases
on the basis of the conveyancing method utilized in dividing the
original tract. Presumably, where the land has been sold, either by
voluntary deed or by bankruptcy sale,2 3 the bona fide purchaser
VIn the Walker case, 3 S. E. (2d) 55, 57 (W. Va. 1939), the court said:
"We tflink the case of Lynch v. Davis, supra, may be distinguished from the
other cases cited, because in that case the court considered a lease executed
by the litigants, and the question involved grew out of the contract relation
created thereby.12
18Pennsylvania courts invented a differentiation between leases creating
corporeal interests and those which convey simply incorporeal rights. Of.
Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. St. 338, 74 Atl. 207 (1909), with the
prior decision in Kelly v. Keys, 213 Pa. St. 295, 62 Atl. 911 (1906).
19 Sinonton, Nature of the Interest of the Grantee Under an Oil and Gas
Lease (1918) 25 NV. VA. L. Q. 295.
20 Williamson v. Jones, 39 W. Va. 231, 10 S. E. 436 (1894); Wilson v. Youst,
43 W. Va. 826, 28 S. E. 781 (1897); and Preston v. Young, 57 W. Va. 278, 50
S. E. 236 (1905). Other absolute ownership decisions include Bodeaw Lum-
ber Co. v. Goode, 160 Ark. 48, 254 S. W. 345 (1923) ; Moore v. Griffin, 72 Kan.
164, 83 Pac. 395 (1905); Williard v. Federal Surety Co., 91 Mont. 465, 8 P.
(2d) 633 (1932) ; Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317, 49 N. E. 399 (1897);
Murray v. Allred, 100 Tenn. 100, 43 S. W. 355 (1897); and Humphreys-Mexia
Co. v. Gammon, 113 Tex. 247, 254 S. W. 296 (1923).
21 Westmoreland Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. St. 235, 249, 18 At]. 724, 725
(1889).
22 Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190, 20 S. Ct. 576, 44 L. Ed. 729 (1900);
Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53 (1908); Liles v.
Texas Co., 166 La. 293, 117 So. 229 (1928); Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204,
117 Pac. 86 (1918).
23 Just as in Pittsburgh & W. Va. Gas Co. v. Ankrom, 83 W. Va. 81, 97 S. E.
593 (1918).
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should be protected. That reasoning obviously fails, if through
recordation of the lease the buyer of a lot has in any event con-
structive notice of the outstanding servitude with all its incidents.
At the other extreme, the co-parcener who takes in severalty by
partition2 4 may insist that his purpart carried with it a share in
future royalties. Yet, had the heir so intended, the prudent thing
would have been the inclusion in the partition decree, or in the
partition deeds, of a definite provision to that effect. Somewhere
in between these examples, the testamentary disposition2 5 might
be cited, together with argument that the intent of the testator
should determine the whole controversy. The short answer would
be that few wills prove either side of the issue as to equitable appor-
tionment. Infrequently the litigation will involve the original
owner's sale of the future royalty under a specified part of his yet-
undivided tract, the later well being drilled on another part of
the land.20 Whether the grantee or devisee receives the subdivision
lot in fee, the oil under a subdivision or the royalty from a definite-
ly-named subdivision, the question is the same: must there be equit-
able apportionment in favor of the nonproducing owner of a sub-
division interest?
Unquestionably many practical considerations have influenced
the courts in formulating the rule for or against apportionment.
Quite apart from the alleged unfairness of permitting drainage of
subdivision oil without compensation to the respective owner, there
are serious obstacles in the way of administering any remedial
precept. It is true these may be overcome, as for the most part
they have been in Pennsylvania and Kentucky; still the flexible
jurisdiction of equity will often hesitate at assuming control when
continuous supervision by the courts is necessary for proper work-
ing of the new equitable principle. In other words, judges must
prefer simple rules easily administered. The most obvious diffi-
culty in apportioning has to do with the royalty division itself.
Where the original tract has been laid off into town lots, there
might be claimants of infinitesimally small fractions of the revenue;
and the division order might need the signature of each.27 Trouble-
24This was the type of situation involved both in Campbell v. Lynch, 81 W.
Va. 374, 94 S. E. 739 (1917) and Walker v. W. Va. Gas Corp., 3 S. E. (2d)
55 (W. Va. 1939).
25 Musgrave v. Musgrave, 86 W. Va. 119, 103 S. E. 302 (1920).
2
0 Eason v. Rosamond, 173 Okla. 10, 46 P. (2d) 471 (1935). Cf. Hoffman
v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S. W. 828 (Tex. Com. App. 1925).
21 These and other arguments of a practical nature were advanced in briefs
of counsel for operators, during the four years of West Virginia litigation
6
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some questions could then arise as ,to the assessment for taxation
purposes of these minute royalty interests. All this assumes the
subdivision boundaries are precisely known, - otherwise, surveys
will have to be made to settle proportional allocations. The free gas
covenant would require construction and reasonable limitation, if
operators' practice had been based on nonapportionment. Further-
more, apportionment assumes an equitable relation between sub-
division owners that should continue on indefinitely into the future.
Whenever such an owner has received a royalty share, manifestly
he must reciprocate as to any development on his own land. The
situation frequently occurs where one owner's lot has been ex-
hausted, and the lease later surrendered; some time afterwards,
further prospecting is undertaken with new leasing of another's
subdivision lot. In the event of production, surely the latter
ought now to share with any other owner whose royalty he has
divided theretofore; yet authority is exiguous on the point. Sound
policy would thus seem to require that such renewal leases be
executed by all those owning subdivisions of the former leasehold.
Practical phases of the sort are merely an illustrative few of the
hurdles the apportionment doctrine has to surmount in order to
gain acceptance.
More than a half-century ago, operators in this state com-
menced the practice of yielding all the royalty or gas well rental to
the subdivision owner on whose lot the producing well had been
drilled. While it may be suggested that disinterestedness in mat-
ters of this sort is rare, there is no reason to doubt the sincere de-
sire of lessees for the easiest solution of the problem, provided only
that resulting litigation be kept to the minimum. True, the prac-
tice of nonapportionment yielded the by-product of reduction in
the number of reversioners with whom the operator had to deal;
if was an unmixed blessing in that respect. When a few years
later the Pennsylvania doctrine of equitable apportionment s was
invented, West Virginia oil and gas companies thoughtfully con-
sidered its practical advantages and disadvantages, but refrained
from changing over from the existing order to the more theoretical
or ideal solution. Their reluctance to alter business custom was
apparently soon vindicated, when the Ohio court definitely re-
(1917-1921). See, for example, petition for re-hearing and argument in sup-
port thereof, filed by counsel for W. J. Collins, an appellee, (Feb. 26, 1917),
in the Ankrom case, - and, in particular, pages 54-57, inclusive.
2s Wettengel v. Gormley, 160 Pa. 559, 28 AtI. 954 (1894); 184 Pa. 354, 39
Ati. 57 (1898).
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jected apportionment.2 9 Indeed, not until 1904 did the issue reach
the supreme court of appeals; lessors, lessees and the legal profes-
sion alike appeared to acquiesce in a most satisfactory rule of
thumb. In that year Rymer v. South Penn Oil Co.0  was decided;
while the litigation involved a joint venture by owners in severalty,
the West Virginia court by dictum expressly approved the Ohio
case critical of the apportionment theory.
It may fairly be asserted that when the equitable apportion-
ment controversy became acute in 1917, settled practice precluded
any over-hasty adoption of new principles. Tens of thousands of
leases were outstanding, under which rights and liabilities had
been uniformly interpreted for decades. In these circumstances,
more than ordinary discussion was prerequisite to the court's
disposition of the various cases that suddenly arose. The first of
these, Lynch v. Davis,3 1 involved division of royalties where de-
visees of a tract had divided it and then executed a joint lease for
oil and gas. A unanimous court held there should be apportion-
ment, though the language of the opinion was much broader than
its facts required.3 2  In the same year, Campbell v. Lynch3 3 pre-
2 )Northwestern Ohio Nat. Gas Co. v. Ullery, 68 Ohio St. 259, 67 N. E. 494
(1902). The Ohio court observed (at p. 271): "We have several times had
occasion to carefully examine and consider that case [. e., the Pennsylvania
decision in Wettengel v. Gormiey] and it has always failed to receive the
approval of our judgment; and upon a reconsideration here, it again fails to
convince us of its soundness."
30 Rymer v. South Penn Oil Co., 54 W. Va. 530, 46 S. E. 559 (1904), held
simply that parole evidence was admissible to establish a no-apportionment
royalty agreement by and between the lessors, - in a joint lease situation
where several tracts owned by various individuals were united in one oil and
gas lease. The court, however, went on unnecessarily to approve the recent
Ohio decision, remarking (pp. 543-544) that the Ullery litigation seemed "to
be a case quite similar to the one at bar and in harmony with the rulings of
this Court, and fully sustaiiis the position hereinbefore taken."
31 79 W. Va. 437, 92 S. E. 427 (1917).
32 In the Ankrom case, 83 W. Va. 81, 87-88, 97 S. E. 593 (1918), the court
said: "I am not unmindful of the fact that the above views are inconsistent
with some expressions contained in the opinion in the case of Lynch v. Davis.
... Upon a consideration of that opinion I find that there are expressions
contained in it which were not at all necessary for the decision of that case....
Confining the language used in the opinion in that case within these limitations,
it is not inconsistent with the opinion we entertain in the present case, and
correctly solves the questions there involved. Any expressions of opinion in
the case of Lynch v. Davis in conflict with the views expressed in this opinion
are disapproved." Ritz, J., wrote the court opinions in both cases.
3381 W. Va. 374, 94 S. E. 739 (1917). While this was the first cause to
come before the appellate tribunal, there had been two earlier lower court
decisions holding against apportionment. Haggerty v. Gas Co., begun in
December, 1905, involved a division of the leased premises by sale: it was
held by the circuit court of Harrison County that the owner of the undevel-
oped land had no claim to a share in the royalties from developed land. To the
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [1939], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol46/iss1/6
EDITORIAL NOTE
sented squarely the whole problem; after leased land had been
partitioned by heirs, a producing well was drilled on one of the lots.
The suit being primarily a local family dispute,34 the Pennsylvania
doctrine35 was adopted by a bare majority of the court,"9 despite
the fact that Arkansas3 7 and Indiana5 had meantime joined with
Ohio39 in rejecting this theory. West Virginia thus became, tem-
porarily at least, an equitable apportionment jurisdiction. A few
months later, a set of facts involving the bankruptcy sale40 of leased
land came before the court: the subdivision owner claimed the en-
tire lessor's share of the revenue from the producer on his land.
With neither fickleness nor inconsistency in the alteration of judg-
ment, the judges on rehearing4 ' by a bare majority 42 refused appor-
same effect was Bailey v. Bailey, a partition setup that was tried by the cir-
cuit court of Lewis County, in November, 1906. Judge Lynch sustained a
demurrer to the bill of complaint in that case, the supreme court of appeals
refusing to grant an appeal from his decree.
34After partition proceedings, the lands owned by Edward Lewis were
divided into seven lots, so that a subdivision apiece was given to Lewis' widow
and to each of his six children. Oil wells were drilled on all the lots save one,
yielding an unusually large production. The one subdivision left undeveloped
had been assigned to the husband and heirs of Prudentia Lewis Campbell, a
deceased daughter of the former owner. As tenant by the curtesy, Dr. Camp-
bell demanded a share of the extremely lucrative royalties from wells draining
that subdivision: the contest was thus between the Campbell family and the
other Lewis heirs, no direct claim against the operator being asserted before
the supreme court. Dean Hogg, as counsel for the Campbells, convinced the
court that the "equities" of the case demanded apportionment.
35 Wettengel v. Gormley, 160 Pa. 559, 28 Atl. 934 (1894) ; 184 Pa. 354, 39
Atl. 57 (1898), requiring apportionment.
36"The court divided three to two. Poffenbarger, P., wrote the majority
opinion in which Lynch and Williams, JJ., concurred. Ritz, J., filed a dis-
sent, with which Miller, J., agreed. It is interesting to note that the only
two judges who had had trial experience in oil and gas law, - Judges Lynch
and Miller, - were divided in opinion. As indicated above, the former had
ruled otherwise while on the circuit bench.
37 Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil & Gas Co., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S. W.
122 (1912).
38 Fairbanks v. Warrum, 56 Ind. App. 337, 104 N. E. 983 (1914).
39 Northwestern Ohio Nat. Gas Co. v. Ullery, 68 Ohio St. 259, 67 N. E. 494
(1902).
40 Pittsburgh & W. Va. Gas Co. v. Ankrom, 83 W. Va. 81, 97 S. E. 593 (1918).
4' The syllabus of the decision originally announced, on January 30, 1917,
read as follows:
"1. Purchasers at a bankruptcy sale of parcels of a large tract of land,
subdivided to entice bidders, take subject to a prior oil and gas lease on the
entire acreage, duly recorded, and are entitled to participate jointly in the
rentals and royalties reserved by the lessors or payable by the lessee under
the terms of the lease, in the ratio each subdivision bears to the area covered
by the lease, notwithstanding the rentals and royalties arise out of productions
from one subdivision only.
"2. In such case, the several purchasers jointly succeed to the rights of the
lessors in the revenues accruing from the lease, in the absence of an express
provision in the deed to the contrary."
9
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tionment, confining their previous decision to its precise facts. 3
In this narrative of events, two circumstances should clearly ap-
pear:
1. Campbell v. Lynch, sanctioning apportionment in a
partition dispute, was not overruled by PittsburghL & West
Virginia Gas Co. v. Ankrom, the later decision refusing it
where sale had divided up the leased premises."
2. While Campbell v. Lynch thus represented the "law
in books", the "law in action" was never altered.4 5 The
operators continued the practice of declining to apportion
royalties, apparently ignoring the result in Campbell v.
Lynch.
Two years later, Musgrave v. Musgrave" brought up the ques-
tion of severance of the lessor's title by devise, with the usual de-
velopment by the operator thereafter. With unfeigned diffidence,
the Ankrom majority4 7 ignored Campbell v. Lynch and denied the
Judge Lynch's opinion thus favoring equitable apportionment, counsel sought
a re-hearing of the issue. After further consideration, the court swung
squarely over to the opposite result, and refused to follow the precedent of
only a few months before.
42 Ritz, J., and Miller, P., continued to oppose apportionment, and were now
joined by Lynch, J. On the other hand, Poffenbarger and Williams, JJ., re-
mained constant to the doctrine of Campbell v. Lynch. Accordingly, the deci-
sion in these lawsuits depended wholly on Judge Lynch's vote.
43Ritz, J., writing for the new majority, stated (83 W. Va. 81, 88): "We
[Miller, P., and Ritz, J.] still adhere to the views expressed in that dissent,
and think the case of Campbell v. Lynch should be overruled, but Judge Lynch,
who concurs with us in this opinion, is of the opinion that the facts in that
case distinguish it from this case, and does not think that the views here ex-
pressed result in overruling that decision."
44 Factually, of course, the cases are distinguishable. In Campbell v. Lynch,
there was little doubt as to the drainage of Dr. Campbell's subdivision by the
various producing wells. In contrast, the Ankrom case involved the sale of
2307 acres to seventy purchasers, the shares ranging from a small fractional
part of an acre to the good-sized lot of 256 acres. (One must bear in mind
that a single gas well was thought to drain but eighty acres.) Clearly, some of
these purchasers would have been unjustly enriched, if drainage of their sub-
divisions were not established.
45 Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action (1910) 44 Am. L. REV. 13. The
fact that the operators consistently maintained their custom of declining to
apportion is a striking one. It was as if the accident of Campbell v. Lynch
had never really happened.
46 86 W. Va. 119, 103 S. E. 302 (1920).
47 Lynch, Miller and Ritz, JJ. The last-named again prepared the opinion
of the court, in which the newest member of the majority (Judge Lynch) con-
curred, without opinion. Judge Miller, on the other hand, took occasion in
his concurrence to criticize sharply the minority position. Yet in deference
to Judge Lynch's views, Campbell v. Lynch was once more spared direct over-
ruling, - even though the drainage present in the Musgrave litigation made it
extremely difficult to distinguish the cases.
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devisees equitable apportionment: such cavalier treatment of that
decision provoked an elaborate dissent" setting forth completely
the theoretical legal basis of the more generous doctrine. Shortly
thereafter, Fisher v. Teter49 permitted a re-examination of the
broad issue in an instance where a subdivision owner claimed there
had been an unfair development of other lots."0 The complainant
was denied relief, again by a bare majority, and the West Virginia
rule of nonapportionment reaffirmed. The final step has now been
taken in the present case of Walker v. West Virginia Gas Corpora-
tion,51 involving a partition setup. Campbell v. Lynch is con-
sidered by the court to have been overruled,5 2 and the Ankrom and
Musgrave cases to be law. The four years of uncertainty, two
decades ago, has ultimately yielded a settled rule of property.
Such is the state of the authorities in West Virginia. There
remains obviously the tabulation of other jurisdictions for and
against this equitable principle. Only two courts are sympathetic,
- Pennsylvania 53 and Kentucky,5 4 - curiously enough, the first
and last to consider the issue. The others all stand in opposition.
Ohio, Arkansas and Indiana decided against royalty division, -
in the early years of the present century, - an antiquarian period
which is almost legal history in the law of oil and gas. Then fol-
lowed the war-time controversy in the West Virginia cases. Okla-
48 The dissent of Poffenbarger, J., (in which Williams, P., concurred), ex-
tends for some thirty pages in the printed report. It contains the best
defense any jurist has written of the equitable apportionment theory. . See
Note (1926) 4 Tax. L. Rav. 339, 346.
49 89 W. Va. 693, 109 S. E. 896 (1921), Poffenbarger and Lynch, JJ., dis-
senting. Ritz, P., with Miller and Lively, JJ., made up the majority.
50 The brief of counsel for appellant, (pp. 2-4), claimed that appellees, her
brothers, had "connived" with the operators to confine the drilling to their
parcels, to her prejudice. The operators had drilled five wells on each of the
brothers' lots; but had deliberately withheld development, (so it was asserted),
as regards the lot that had come to the sister. Counsel for the operators, also
appellees, naturally denied any such alleged connivance, as wholly unsupported
by the record in the case.
r1 3 S. E. (2d) 55 (W. Va. 1939).
52 The court's language is careful yet precise on this point, (3 S. 11. (2d)
55, 57): "But it is clear to us that the rulings of this court in the three cases
last cited above amount, in effect, to the substitution of a different doctrine
from that announced in Campbell v. Lynch, supra."I
5s Wettengel v. Gormley, 160 Pa. 559, 28 Atl. 954 (1894) ; 184 Pa. 354, 39
Atl. 57 (1898).
51McIntire's Adm'r v. Bond, 227 Ky. 607, 13 S. W. (2d) 772 (1929).
Dietzman, J., writing the opinion for a unanimous court, adopts and quotes
from the reasoning of the Musgrave dissent by Poffenbarger, J. In this
Kentucky instance perhaps, the latter was a "prophet not without honor".
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homa15 and Texas"' soon came around to the nonapportionment
stand, making the weight of authority number five jurisdictions.
Perhaps this is really an understatement of the actual situation:
no doubt operators generally follow the majority rule, even where
the problem has not as yet undergone judicial scrutiny.
In this legal background of American case-law, with West Vir-
ginia following the weight of authority, one must inevitably specu-
late as to the correct solution on principle. Oil and gas law is so
relatively young that if error exists correction may yet occur; there
need be no bigoted attachment to doctrines and practices of past
generations. For any such investigation of the majority rule,
there should be a ready comprehension of first principles. To
begin with, - the oil and gas lease is not a true lease in the strict
sense of the term; it is rather in -the nature of a profit a prendre,
whether for years or in fee." Similarly, the royalty or rental
payable under the lease is not rent, technically, like the common
law incorporeal hereditament of rents, - but a compensation for
the use of the profit over the entire land.58 Thus the royalty serves
two functions; it pays both for the fugacious minerals actually
taken and for the continued existence of the profit in the undevel-
oped subdivisions. Whether these royalties are properly regarded
as incorporeal interests in realty is wholly irrelevant. In any
eent, the royalty is appurtenant to the reversion of the lessor,
and may be assigned over along with the reversion or severed from
it, in exactly the same fashion as true rents.
The fallacy, if there be one, in the majority rule lies not in the
classification of the royalty as something other than rent, - for
these courts are correct in regarding it as a wholly anomalous type
of compensation.59 The error occurs rather in overlooking this
5 Kimbley v. Luckey, 72 0kla. 217, 179 Pac. 928 (1919), which has been
followed in four subsequent cases.
58 Stephenson v. Glass, 115 Tex. 192, 279 S. W. 260 (1926). It should be
noted, however, that the Texas decisions are not consistently opposed to
apportionment.
57 Simonton, supra n. 19.
Gs Believing that the -royalty is not merely a return for the right to take oil
from the land whence the oil is taken, Poffenbarger, J., said in his Musgrave
dissent (86 W. Va. 119, 124, 131): " Manifestly it is that, but it is just as
clearly something more than that. Besides paying for the oil taken out, it
holds the lease on all of the land and oil included within its boundaries. It
maintains the lessee's right to carry his operations to every part of the tract
and precludes operation or mining on any part of it by the owner and every-
body else except assignees of the lessee. How then can it be said to be only
pay for the oil taken outly
59 Cf. Judge Miller's concurring opinion in the Musgrave case (86 W. Va.
119, 124, 103 S. E. 302): "... rent can only issue out of land, and not out
12
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second function the royalty performs, namely, that of holding the
profit for the entire leasehold. In other words, the owner of an
undeveloped subdivision has no legal claim to an offset well, pro-
vided the lessee has already adequately developed the land.c0 So,
too, the minority has stressed overmuch the rent analogy, in work-
ing out the apportionment result.01 The just solution must depend
not on fancied resemblance to the landlord-tenant relation, but on
of an incorporeal hereditament as this separate entity characterized as royalty
is said to be."
Judge Ritz' argument in the Ankrom case for the nonapportionment rule
may be briefly summarized, (83 W. Va. 81, 84, 97 S. E. 593): "Oil and gas
are minerals, and so long as they are in place they belong to the owner of the
land under which they lie, and the right also belongs to that owner of the land
to explore for them and extract them therefrom. If they escape from his
premises to the premises of another before he has captured them, they nIo
longer are his property; and vice versa, if by exploration on his premises oil
escapes thereto from the premises of an adjoining owner it thereby becomes
his property. From this it necessarily follows that when these defendants
purchased their respective parcels of land from the trustee in bankruptcy they
bought all of the estate therein, subject only to the right of the plaintiff heroin
to explore for and produce the oil and gas. This right which is conferred upon
the lessee is exactly the same that would have existed in these purchasers had
there been no lease, from which it necessarily follows that the owner of each
sub-division is entitled to the royalties on all of the oil produced from wells
drilled on his sub-division."
Professor Simonton [in Note (1918) 25 W. VA. L. Q. 231, 233) combines
these two ideas: "This rule as to apportionment of rent on severance of the
reversion is inapplicable to oil and gas royalties. It is manifestly impossible
to determine the rental value of an undeveloped tract of land for the purpose
of oil and gas production. The difficulty lies in the fact that oil and gas
royalties are not paid for the use and occupation of land as rent is under an
ordinary lease. Instead they are the price paid for the severing and carrying
away of a part of the substance of the land - for the doing of a thing which
would be waste if done by a tenant who has the use and occupation of the ]and.
It is difficult to see how there can be any distinction between an oil and gas
royalty and the royalty paid under the ordinary coal lease, particularly in
West Virginia, where it is settled law that the owner of the land owns the oil
and gas in place under the land, just as he owns the coal under the land.'
60 On the other hand, if the lessee has not adequately developed the lensed
tract, further development may not be arbitrarily refused. The device of
partial cancellation may become available to the lessor in the event the court
holds the implied condition of further development has not been properly met.
See Comments (1934) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 175; id. at 177, and Note, id. at 375.
Meantime, pending such partial cancellation, it is settled law that the drill-
ing of a producing well operates to bind every acre of the leased land. As
long as the one well yields paying production, the lease holds the entire tract.
That is to say, - the operator has a monopoly as to development of the lease-
hold. Neither the lessor nor any assignee of his, in whole or in part, may
attempt independent drilling, individually or through agents. The producing
profit a prendre is both exclusive and complete, so that a subdivision grantee
becomes absolutely helpless as against the peril of drainage.
51 Judge Poffenbarger's preference was clearly for the rent analogy, though
he recognized royalty was compensation for a profit. For example, in his Ius-
grave dissent, he wrote (86 W. Va. 119, 124, 156, 103 S. E. 302): "The
royalty in an oil lease is just as clearly compensation for the use of the land
as the rent payable under an industrial, mercantile or agricultural lease, where-
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reasonable incidents attaching to the oil and gas lease. First and
foremost, the operator must be protected; the financial hazards of
that business are too great to justify imposing additional burdens
merely because the lessor's reversion has been subdivided. Second-
ly, the present legal position of the owner of the undeveloped sub-
division should take into account more fully the three existing
handicaps already named:
1. The oil and gas underlying the undeveloped subdivi-
sion may be drained away through a nearby well located on
another lot.6
2
2. The owner of the undeveloped lot has no legal power
to compel the lessee to drill further, assuming there has been
proper development; and obviously there can be no independ-
ent drilling, since the subdivision is already under lease.
3. The caprice or prejudice of the operator may deter-
mine the location of the development; and the owners of unde-
veloped lots are powerless to interfere with this choice. Wholly
apart from the uncertainty attending their chances of future
royalties, the lessee has opportunity to exert equitable duress
in maldng selection of the subdivision to be developed.63
fore it, too, obviously issues out of the land, within the legal meaning of the
terms."
In Greer, The Payment of Royalties to Successors in Interest to Lessors in
Oil Leases (1921) 93 CENT. L. J. 330, it is said: "The same reasoning would
lead to a denial of apportionment of rents in the agricultural lease, because
the lessor there unquestionably owns the land after he has leased it, and the
purchaser of a part of the land is the owner of the reversion as to the part he
purchases .... It is therefore submitted the outcome is unsound, and it would
be much more consonant with legal principles and avoid many complications
and unjust results if the courts would hold royalties to be simply rentals, and
apply all the law of landlord and tenant to the rights of the parties."
Various cases have been collected by Professor Simonton, supra n. 59, tend-
ing to show that West Virginia courts have consistently refused to regard
royalty payments as rents.
02 This consideration is the one stressed by the writer of the A. L. R. note
on the problem (1929) 64 A. L. R.. 634, 637-639,--which is perhaps the ablest
discussion in print supporting the apportionment doctrine. So, also, Comment
(1919) 4 CoaN. L. Q. 71, 73, points out that the coal royalty analogy is not
in point, since the coal operator removes only the coal under the lessor's tract.
The coal operator does not normally mine minerals under adjoining subdi-
visions, (i. e., the hazard of "drainage" is never present).
0 In the Musgrave dissent, Judge Poffenbarger reflected this apprehension,
(86 W. Va. 119, 124, 149-151, 3.03 S. E. 302): "I here state what I have been
reluctant to mention, although it has been apparent all the time, namely,
that the construction opens wide the door to the rankest kind of imposition.
The lessee can drill on any one of the parts he may see fit to select, and he
may make his location depend upon what he can get the owner of one of the
parts to concede to him, by way of inducement. He can delay and bargain
with the different parties until he obtains a bonus or reward in money or a
14
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Many companies in other jurisdictions have realized there may
be unfairness in denying apportionment absolutely in every case,
and have therefore inserted in their leases a specific provision
achieving the equitable result. This usually stipulates a division
of the royalties, proportioned to the acreage.84 It is not only inter-
esting that lessees have themselves worked out such a solution, -
perhaps the practical difficulties in the way of apportionment are
not after all so insurmountable, - but it is important that at
least one nonapportionment jurisdiction has recognized its valid-
ity. 5 Nevertheless, both the equitable apportionment rule and the
newer lease provision seem unsatisfactory in their present form.
Surely the owner of an undeveloped lot should have no share in
royalties unless his minerals are being drained away; and that
owner ought properly to have the burden of establishing the drain-
age under his land. If such a limitation were imposed, equitable
apportionment would then appear to be the correct solution on
principle.
There is finally the query as to whether by lease provision or
by legislation"8 a duly limited apportionment doctrine should ever
share of the royalty for drilling on his part, and, in consideration of hlis
draining the oil from the other parts through the wells on that part."
Compare with the principle that equity will enjoin the unconscionable
exercise of a legal right the language of the court in Fisher v. Toter, 89
W. Va. 693, 698, 109 S. E. 896 (1921): "It is not unlawful for one adjoin-
ing owner to persuade a lessee to first drill and develop his land subject to
such common lease, provided no injury is done to the land of the other; and
certainly he could not be compelled to account to the unsuccessful contestant
for the right of priority in development for oil or gas produced on his land
by such prior development, unless, as said, there resulted unlawful drainage
and fraud therein injuriously affecting the land of such adjoining owner."
Of. also, Ames, How Far an Act Maj Be a Tort Because of the Wrongfit
Motive of the Actor (1904) 18 AVn. L. Rzv. 411, 414 ff.
64The provision usually reads as follows: "If the leased premises shall
hereafter be owned in severalty or in separate tracts, the premises, nevortho-
less shall be developed and operated as one lease and all royalties accruing
hereunder shall be treated as an entirety and shall be divided among and paid
to such separate owners in the proportion that the acreage owned by each
such separate owner bears to the entire leased acreage."
65 Gypsy Oil Co. v. Schonwald, 107 Okla. 253, 231 Pac. 864 (1924). Cf.
Schrader v. Gypsy Oil Co., 38 IT. 1E. 124, 28 P. (2d) 885 (1933).
86 Such legislation, if enacted, should be in much the following form:
"Where land shall hereafter be leased under an oil and gas lease, and prior
to its development the lessor's reversion therein shall be subdivided by devise,
partition, sale or otherwise, so that the land subsequently be owned in sever-
alty, or in separate tracts, the leasehold shall nevertheless be developed and
operated as one lease, as if there had been no such subdivision. Upon satis-
factory proof of drainage in a proper proceeding, all royalties and gas well
rentals accruing under such lease sliall, in the absence of agreement between
the parties otherwise, be ordered divided among and paid to such separate
owners as may be affected by the producing well or wells, in the proportion
15
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be introduced into West Virginia. With deep-well drilling6 7 con-
stantly in progress, to gas-bearing sands with enormous rock pres-
sure, drainage today has possibly a new significance for property
owners. If improved methods permit operators to confine develop-
ment to fewer and fewer wells,6" perhaps change ought to be made
as to all future leases, in order to protect more adequately the
modern subdivision owner.6 9 This is a hard question to answer, con-
sidering the half-century of contrary practice. In any event,
existing nonapportionment doctrine has clearly become too well
established to be brushed aside by court action. It is now in fact
a "rule of property".
C. C. WnmiAs, JR.
R. B. GOODvIN.
that the acreage subject to drainage owned by the respective separate owner
shall bear to the entire area so drained." This provision, if enacted, might
be inserted in W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) at the end of Article 4 of Chapter 37,
relating to partition,-or, better still, at the end of Article 9 of Chapter 37,
relating to apportionment of rent.
67 MARTENS, PETROGR.APHY AND CORREILATION OF DEEP-WELL SECTIONS IN
WEST VIRGINIA AND ADJACENT STATES (1939) WEST VIRGINIA GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY; TUCKER, DEEP-WELL RECORDS (1936) WEST VIRGINIA GEOLOGICAL
SuRvEY.
65 The ordinary practice in the past has been to assume a gas well will drain
eighty to eighty-five acres, depending upon the configuration of the land.
Deep-well drilling has recently yielded wells with productions of twenty
million cubic feet from the Oriskany sands. In these circumstances, operators
have now tended to space their wells at greater intervals, both by reason of the
high cost of deep drilling and because increased drainage is thought to follow
from the terrific rock pressure. With such a background, no doubt operators
should more and more prefer joint leases, as in the Lynch v. Davis situation:
the joint lease of a large tract would enable both economical operation and
adequate protection of the leasehold. It is then only a short step from pop-
ularizing joint leases over to the statutory provision of the sort set forth in
n. 66 supra.
Go The criticism may be advanced that drainage is, after all, merely a ques-
tion of expert opinion: one cannot absolutely establish it beyond peradventure
of a doubt. In many instances, no doubt this is true; yet modern geological
investigation tends to minimize difficulties of proof. For example, if there are
wells on contiguous tracts, flow indicators may be utilized to show drainage.
Cf. U. S. Geological Survey Bull., Series 0, No. 58, Underground-Water Papers
(1906) 74. Many substances used in tracing the flow of water are available
for detecting drainage from.oil wells. Among such flow indicators are: (1)
materials dissolved in solution and recognized by chemical or physical tests;
(2) materials dissolved in solution and recognized by their color; (3) mate-
rials suspended in the liquid and recognized by microscopic examinations; and
(4) cultures of bacteria suspended in the liquid and recognized in samples
taken by their cultural characteristics.
If, on the other hand, there are wells only on the draining tract, the fact of
probable drainage can be shown through tests on the adjoining land as to
rock pressure, porosity of the strata, and thickness of the I pay".
See, further, as to manner of proving drainage Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Strauss, 243 S. W. 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Steel v, American Oil Dev, Co.,
80 W, Va. 206, 92 S. E. 410 (1917).
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [1939], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol46/iss1/6
